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DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS*
TaomAS R. GoRDoN
Judge Jefferson Circuit Court, Louisville, Ky.
The profession has taken hold with a vigorous hand of a plan
to enable persons who have an actual controversy as to their rights
in certain circumstances to have an authoritative and binding declaration of their rights by the court before there is an actual breach
by one and an actual loss by another, thereby avoiding the legal
combat or loss by either party. The purpose is laudable-the bar
has manifestly not only an interest, but an unselfish interest, in
devising and indorsing the plan. It is a new step in procedural law.
It is a reform and therefore may be met with hesitancy and
conservatism that may or may not ultimately prevent the accomplishment of the object. I feel sure that the Kentucky bar will hear a
discussion of the question with a willingness to accept it if on investigation it is found valuable. Nothing but good can come of the
discussion. The law is a growth; it must and will adapt itself to
the growing needs and demands of society. It devolves upon the
bar to lend full assistance in directing this adjustment.
The original power of judicature by the fundamental principles of society is lodged in society at large. (1 Bl. Coin. 267.)
The life of the law has not 'been logic, it has been experience.
(Holmes' Common Law, p. 1.)
*This paper Is a reprint of an address delivered July 7, 1921, before the KenIt is published here by the kind permission of the
tucky Bar Association.
-uthor and of the Secretary of the Bar Association.
The Kentucky State Bar Association by resolution on July 7, 1921, unanimously endorsed the principle of Declaratory Judgments and authorved a committep to seek the passage of such an Act by the Kentucky Legislature. The Louisville Bar Association also at a recent meeting adopted the principle without diszent, and directed the appointment of a similar committee.
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Most men are honest. Lawsuits for the most part arise from an
honest difference of opinion as to the rights of the parties; often it
is a difference of opinion entertained by the parties, perhaps more
often a difference of opinion between counsel.
If the parties could find out their rights before acting, their
action would conform most frequently to their rights. If counsel
had means of knowing with reasonable certainty the rights of their
clients, their clients would be saved loss by acting within their rights.
It is an accepted principle that the courts' aid may not be invoked
until a wrong is committed nor unless the judgment is to be enforced
by process for immediate relief. The principle is tersely stated in
Woods v. Fuller, 61 Md. 457:
"A court of equity will not take jurisdiction unless it can
afford immediate relief. .
... It must be borne in mind that
the decree of a court of equity, and not its opinion, is the instriment through viich it acts in granting relief. However
sound and clear such opinion may be, as an abstract proposition
of law, yet if the principle it declares can not be carried into
effect by a decree, in the ease in which it is given, it is wholly
valueless, and an idle and nugatory act."
The courts have "refused to allow parties to appear in court,
except under conditions which permit a display of force by the
judicial arm of the State."
The wisdom of such condition of the law is well doubted and
there is a persistent effort to give relief to those who have controversies without the necessity of legal combat incident to the ordinary lawsuit.
In an interesting and able paper read before the Tennessee Bar
Association (1920) by Mr. Gates, the principle is thus stated:
"It has been urged, and I think wisely, that frequently
pwarties desire to obtain a mere declaration of right without seeking the coercive relief to which they might be entitled, and that
such a procedure psychologically makes for better understanding between business men. I think we can readily appreciate
that ordinarily parties to contracts would much prefer a mere
declaration of their rights thereunder than to -wait a brea&h
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and the seeking of coercive relief 'by one or the other. The
antagonisms that are engendered in a bitterly fought lawsuit
u~ually leave their sears. On the other 'hand, there is probably
less bitterness occasioned in a proceeding in which the court is
called upon to merely settle disputes or misunderstandings between parties over the construction of the contract or over the
relative rights of the parties. It would enable the profession to
remove the uncertainty and the doubt from matters that are
being presented constantly to it. It would enable a party to
obtain a determination of his rights without waiting for the
other to become the aggressor. And there are many other arguments that may ,be advanced on behalf of this new departure."
And Prof. Sunderland, of Miehigan University, 54 American
Law Review, No. 2, page 173, announces the principle thus:
"Every ease may by this means become in appearance, ait
least, a friendly suit. There is no doubt that the personal animosities developed by litigation are serious drawbacks to the
usefulness of the courts. To sue is'to fight, and fights make endless feuds. Parties hesitate to resort to the courts because they
shrink from a state of war with their neighbors or business associates. . . . When you ask for a declaration of right only
you treat him as a gentlemn."
Declaratory judgments in one form or another have been authorized in the English courts beginning with 1859. In that year the
practice of the High Court of Chancery was amended so as to provide that "no suit in the said court shall be open to objection on
the ground that a mere declaratory decree or order is sought thereby
and it shall be lawful for the court to make binding declaration
of rights without granting consequential relief. (15 and 16 Vic., c.
86, s. 50.)
In 1873 the Judicature Act was passed and in 1883 Rule 5 of
Order 25 was promulgated and it provided: "No action or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a merely
declaratory decree or order is sought thereby, and the. court may
make binding declarations of right whether any consequential relief is or could be claimed or not." It will be observed that in this
provision the remedy is not confined to the Court of Chancery.
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The State of Rhode Island, as appears in General Laws 1909,
Chapter 289, Section 19, adopted a provision as follows:
"No suit in equity shall be defeated on -the ground that a
mere declaratory decree is sought; and the court may make
binding declaration of right in equity without granting consequential relief."
And later, by statute, it is provided as follows:
"Subject to rules any person claiming a right cognizable
in a court of equity under a deed, will or other written instrument, may -apply for the determination of any question of con
struction thereof, in so far as the same affects such right, and
for a declaration of the rights of the persons interested."
And in the State of Connecticut, General Statutes 1918, Section 5113, provides:
"An action may be brought by any person claiming
any interest in . . . real or personal property
-against any person who may claim . . . any interest . . .
,adverse to the plaintiff . . . for the purpose of determining
such adverse . . . interest and to clear up ell doubts and
disputes and to quiet and settle the title to the saxne."
Since such legislation as has been passed by any of the States is
based in a general way upon the English Act, it seems well to insert
it here. It is as follows ,
"Section 1. Scope. In any action the plaintiff may ask
for a declaration of rights, either alone or with other relief, in
m~y make -a"binding -declaration
hi dompaint; and the -ltf
of rights, whether or not consequential relief is or .oulclb
claimed at the time.
"Section 2. Construction. Any person -interested .under a
deed, will' contract or oiher WrIen lnstrument or whose rights
are affected by a tattfAte, tiay brihg an action th deterinine
question of construbtioxi or validity exising iinder.the instrunieiit
-or itatute. ,and f)r Q, deol~aration of his rights -or dut.es t~hereT
under.
"Section 3. Before Breach. A contract may 1bp coistriel

!W~oS. there tas tedn &'AbreadL thei'eof.
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"Section 4. Discretionary. The court may refuse to exercise the power to declare rights and to construe instruments in
any case where a decision under it would not terniinate the
uncertainty or controversy which gave rise to the action, -or in
any case where the declaration -or construction is not necessary
and proper at the time under all the circumstances.
"Section 5. Executors, etc. Any person interested as or
through an executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or other
fiduciary, creditor, devisee, legatee, heir, next of kin, or cestui
que trust, in the administration of trust or of the estate of a
decedent, an infant, a lunatic or an insolvent, may bring an
action:

"(1) To ascertain any class of creditors, devisees, legatees,
heirs, next of kin or others; or
"(2)
To direct the executors, aduministrators or trustees to
do or abstain from doing any particular act in their fiuda y
capacity; or
"(3)
To determine any question, arising in the administration of the estate or trust, including questions' 6f coiistruetion
"Section 6. Parties. When declaratory relief is sought all
persons shall be rnade parties vho 1have or claim- any interest
which would be affected by the decaaration, and no ,dcA.ration
shall, except as otherwise provided in these rules, piej-idie the.
rights of persons not parties to the -action.
"Section 7. Attorney-General. In any action which involves the validity of a statute the Attorney-General 4hall, before the judgment is entered, be notified by the - aa itaekingthe statute, and shall be edititled to be herd upon s h ( iestion.
"Seetibn 8. A unicipal 'Ordiiance. In any Lation "which
involves the validity of a municipal ordinance the coirepilding
municipal legal .officer shalI ie'simiil~rly notified and entitled to.
be heard; and'if the ordinanck is allegecl to beunconstitutional
the Attorney-General @ial a
be ihotified and entitled. io be
heard."
This act is set out, with notes and- citations -of easds under- each
sectidn, in Central Law Journal, Volume -91, page 264. In that
article it is said:
"The Auerieari. B A ci666V at its latSsegsidn 'i St.
Louis on August 27, 1920, after an interesting debate, Oi !inder
the per~uasivei eloueeh
bf-Mr. T. J. O'Donngl 4,f Qenver,
Colo.; and Hon.-Charle 11E;
Hitglei of New:Y-k, 'Votd
Tavor
of a resolution- asidng Congress to grant to'thqd'fedfl Wourts
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jurisdiction to 'declare the rights iand other legal relations on
written request for such declaration, whether -or not further relief is or could be claimed, and such declaration shall have due
force of a final judgment.' "
There seems to have arisen. in the last few years a new interest
in the principles set out in the English Act and applied in the English cases based upon the Act, so that we have legislation in several
States on declaratory judgments--fichigan Act in 1919, Wisconsin
Act same year, Florida Act the same year, Kansas Act 1921.
Since the Kansas Act is the latest in point of time and was
based on the light of extensive discussion of the principles contained
in the other Acts, particularly in the Michigan Act which the
Supreme Court of Michigan held uncohastitutional and to which I
shall later refer, it may be well to 'set it out in full, as follows:
"AN ACT Relating to J.eclaratory Judgments.
"Be it enacted 'by the .Legislature of the 'State of Kansas:
"Section 1. In eases of actual controversy, courts of record,
-within the scope of'their respective jurisdictions, shall have power
to make binding adjudications of right, whether .or not consequential relief is, or at'the, time could be, claimed, and no action
or proceeding shall be open to objection on the ground that a
judgment or order merely declaratory of right is prayed for.
Controversies involving the interpretation of deeds, wills, other
instruments of writing, 'statutes, m unicipal ordinances and other
ay be so determined, and this
governmental regulations,
enumeration does not exelude other instances of actual antagonstio assertion -and denial'of right.
"Section 2. Declaratork judgments may be obtained and
reviewed as other judgments, acdording to the code of civil procedure.
"Section 3. Further relief based on a declaratory judgment may be granted whenever necessary or proper. The 'application shall be 'bypetition to a court having jurisdiction to
grant the relief. If the appliRetion be deemed sufficient, the
court shall, on reasonable notice, require any adverse party
whose rights 'have 'been adjudicated 'by the declaration of right
to show, cause why further relief, should not be granted forthwith.
"Section- 4. When a declaration of right or the granting
Of further relief based thereon shell involve the determination
of issnes o facttrlabaq by a jury,. such issues may b& submitted
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to !a jury in the form of interrogatories, with proper instructions
by the court, whether a general verdict be required or not.
"Section 5. The parties to a proceeding to obtain a declaratory judgment may stipulate with reference to the allowance of
costs, ,and in the absence of such stipulation the court may make
such an award of costs as may seem equitable and just.
"Section 6. This act is declared to be remedial; its purpose is to afford relief from the uncertainty and insecurity attendant upon controversies over legal rights, without requiring
one of the parties interested so to invade the rights asserted by
the other as to entitle him to maintain -an ordinary action therefor; and it is to be liberally interpreted and administered, with
a view to making the courts more serviceable to the people.
"Section 7. This act shall take effect on publication in the
official State paper."
In Yale Law Journal, Vol. 29, No. 8, page 908, Mr. George W.
Wickersham, late Attorney-General of the United Staies, discusses
the New York Practice Act, which contains a provision authorizing
declaratory judgments. He says:
"A new provision is inserted empowering the Supreme
Court in any action or proceeding 'to declare rights and other
-legal relations on request for such declaration, whether or not
further relief is or could be claimed, and such declaration shall
have the force of a final judgment.' The rules of court are to
make such provisions as shall be necessary and proper to carry
the provisions of this section into effect. Judgment may be
rendered by the court in favor of any party or parties, and
against any party or parties -at any stage of the action or appeal if warranted by the pleadings or admissions of the party or
parties and the judgment may be rendered by the court as to a
part of the cause of action and the action proceed as to -the
remaining issues as justice may require."
And"All these provisions are in line with the most enlightened
and advanced views of simplification of practice in courts."
At the last Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws,
held in St. Louis, August of last year, at which nearly all of the
States of the Union were represented (Kentucky, I regret to say,
being one of the few not so represented), the Commission had under
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consideration the principle of declaratory judgments. An interesting report was made and a tentative draft of a ,law to be submitted to the several States was approved by the commission and
passed to the next session, which meets with the American Bar Association at Cincinnati in August of this year, for revision and review. I append to this paper a copy of the proposed statute for consideration of this Association.
An able article reviewing this tentative draft, together with
citation of authorities, by Prof. Edwin I. Borchard, of Yale, will be
found in the Harvard Law Review, May, 1921, Vol. 34, No. 7, page
697.
There have been many adjudications under the declaratory
judgment enactments. The practice has gorown in favor in the English courts. In one volume of the reports for the year 1919 it is noted
that over half the cases reported were declaratory judgments, and in
a volume for 1917 an examination of the cases decided on appeal
discloses that sixty-seven per cent were declaratory actions. This, of
course, takes no note of the vast number of cases that were decided
in the lower courts and not appealed, and it has been said that it
may be fairly assumed that the lower court decisions were more
numerous in proportion because it is reasonable to suppose that
declaratory actions are less likely to be appealed than cases where
coercive judgments are. rendered.
In this paper it is possible to select and note only a few cases
illustrating the principles of the declaratory judgment.
In Zinc Corporation v. Hursch, 1 K. B. 541, there is a declaration that a contract by an Australian frm to supply their whole
output of zinc to a German resident in Geninany was wholly dissolved by the declaration of war and not merely suspended, so that
the Australian knew he was free to dispose of his product as he
saw fit.
In Stevenson v. Aktiengesellschaft (1916), 1 K. B. 763, there
,was a partnership between an Englishman resident in England and
a German resident in Germany for the manufacture in England of
a certain article. The profits from the manufacture of this article
rose materially titer the outbreak of the war, and the Englishman
desired to know what the rights of his German partner were in those
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war profits. He obtained a declaration that the partnership with an
alien enemy was completely dissolved upon the outbreak of the war
and that the enemy had no share in the profits subsequently earned.
Of course, it would follow that he was liable for no losses.
Most English leases contain a clause requiring the lessor's consent to sublet, but providing that such consent should not be unreasonably withheld. Very frequently a lessor will attempt to impose unreasonable conditions upon giving consent, such as increased
rent or a money payment, and the lessee will then bring an action
asking merely for a declaration that the landlord's consent is being
unreasonably withheld. Such a declaration was made in Young v.
Ashley Gardens (1903), 2 Ch. 113 C. A., where Cozens-Hardy, L. J.,
said:
"If we refused a declaration here the lessee's property
would diminish in value, as his assignee would ran the risk
of being turned out'by the lessor. I can not imagine a more
judicious or beneficial exercise of the jurisdiction to make a
declaratory order."
Query: Under our law where, in a lease, a provision is made
that the premises can not be sublet without the 'Consent of the lessor,
would the court hold that unreasonable refusal to consent would be
permitted?
In the case of Societe Maritime v. Venus S. S. Co., 9 Commercial
Cases 289 (K. B. D., 1904), the facts are: A contracted with B to
load 75,000 tons of ore a year on B's ships for a period of years.
When the contract had still 1/ years to run, C informed A that B
had assigned his contract to C and that C would claim the benefit
of it. C tendered a ship to be loaded and A refused to load it. A
then brought an action for a declaration that he was not bound to
load C's ships under the contract with B. Channell, J., in giving
judgment, said:
"In reference to a mercantile transaction of this sort parties are entitled now to come into court and say, 'It is important to us in reference to this contract, which has a year and
a half to run, to know whether we are bound by it or not.'
They are not entitled to come and ask a court of law
for ran opinion upon a speculative or academic question;' but
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showing the necessity of a decision upon it, I think they are
entitled to a declaration as to whether or not the contract is
binding upon them. They are not bound at their peril to refuse to perform it and then to be liable for heavy damages for
not performing it for the space of the next year and a half."
In Thompson Bros. & Company v. Amis, (1917) 2 Ch. 211, a
dispute arose between the parties over the proper construction of
the contract of employment whereby the plaintiffs employed the defendant. The defendant, by way of compensation, was entitled to
receive a sum equivalent to a certain share of the net divisible profits
of the rarm. The plaintiffs sought to deduct from the return for excess profits made by them the real remuneration paid to the defendant. This the surveyor of taxes declined to allow. The plaintiffs
gave notice of an appeal. The defendant insisted upon a settlement
under his contract. Thereupon the plaintiffs sought a declaration
that they were entitled to recover from the defendant as and when
the return was paid, by way of excess profits duty in respect of the
increased remuneration of the defendant for the period in controversy. A declaration was made as required. In other words, the
question with which the parties were confronted was whether or not
the manager's additional compensation ought to be estimated before
or after the deduction of the excess profits tax. The plaintiffs were
not obliged to wait until there had been a demand made on them by
the manager for the larger compensation, but obtained from the
court a declarition as to the proper basis of computation.
In Mayor of Bayonne v. East Jersey Water Company, 108 AtL
121, the city of Bayonne had a contract with the New York and New
Jersey Water Company to supply it with water and the latter company in turn obtained its water from the East Jersey Water Company. The New York and New Jersey Water Company sold its
plant and assigned its contract with the East Jersey Water Company
to the city of Bayonne. Immediately thereafter the East Jersey
Water Company notified the city that at the expiration of a certain
date it would no longer supply the city with water, assigning as
reason therefor that it had no contract with the city and that the
assignment of the New York and New Jerpey Water Company relieved it from fprther liability. Thereupon the city filed suit for
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an injunction and a declaration of rights. And out of this arose
three questions for determination: (1) Did the purchase by the city
terminate the obligations of the East Jersey Water Company; (2) If
not ended by the purchase, will it end on September 6, 1919; and
(3) if not terminated by the purchase or if it does not terminate on
September 6, 1919, but continues until June 21, 1929, is the East
Jersey Water Company under any obligation to supply Bayonne
with water after that date, and if so, then is its obligation to supply
water only for municipal purposes or also for resale to outside consumers And the court proceeded to settle the rights of the parties
under the contract, not only the right to an injunction presently,
but adjudged the rights, some of which would only arise in the
future. Through this ,means a complete disposition was had, once
for all time-all of the matters in controversy being judicially settled and all doubts or questions of construction that might arise over
the contract resolved, and the parties knew what their respective
rights and duties were.
The Michigan statute was held unconstitutional in the case of
Anway v. Grand Rapids Railway Co. (Michigan Supreme Court,
September, 1920), 179 N. W. Reporter, 305, 211 Mich. 592.
Anway was a conductor employed by the Grand Rapids Railway Company. The statute prohibited the employment of such employes more than six days in the week, except under certain conditions of emergency, and fixed a penalty. Anway desired to work
more than six days in the week and the railway company desired to
employ him more than six days. Anway instituted his action seeking a declaratory judgment that if the railway company should employ him to work more than six days in the week that it would not
be a violation of the law, in effect holding unconstitutional the Act
against such employment. A labor union, of which Anway was not
a member,. interplead and contended that the statute should be construed to prevent -plaintiff from working more than six days in the
week. From a declaratory judgment upholding plaintiff's contention an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court. So much of the
Michigan statute with reference to declaratory judgments above referred to, 'but not quoted, as was brought in question were Sections
1 and 3, as follows:
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"Section 1. No action or proceeding in any court of
record shall be open to objection on the ground that a merely
declaratory judgment, decree or order is sought thereby and the
court may make binding declarations of rights whether any
consequential relief is or could be claimed or not, including the
determination at the instance of any one claiming to be interested under a deed, will or other written instrument of any question of construction arising under the instrument and a declaration of the rights of the parties interested.
"Section 3. Where further relief based upon a declaration
of rights shall become necessary or proper after such declaration
'has been made, application may be made by petition to any court
having jurisdiction to grant such relief for an order directed
to any party or parties whose rights have been determined by
such declaration to show cause why further relief should not be
granted forthwith upon such reasonable notice as shall be prescribed by the court in such order."
The opinion reversing the case and holding the Act unconstitutional was by a divided court, the Chief Justice for himself and
five of his associates holding the Act unconstitutional, and Judge
Sharpe for himself and one other member of the court held to the
contrary. The opinion concludes that the duties imposed upon the
court under the statute are non-judicial in their nature; but the
question in the case presented was a moot question; that the Legislature had no right to impose upon the court any duty not embraced
in its judicial power; that it will not determine moot questions; that
it is not an exercise of judicial power where a judgment rendered is
not to be. enforced -by the court. It will be readily seen from the
statement of fact that there was no controversy between Anway and
the railway company and therefore it might well be said that the
question was a moot question, and under this state of case the court
could well have reversed and directed a dismissal of the petition.
It was not necessary to 'decide the question of the constitutionality
of the declaratory judgment statute in that case. No party to the
record raised that question. The court, however, invited the Attorney-General and Prof. Sunderland, who had written the very
able argument above referred to, published in American Law Review, Vol. 54, No. 2, page 161, entitled "The Courts as Authorized
Legal Advisers of the People," to appear and brief the case. The
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court was manifestly unduly impressed with the title of that article
by Prof. Sunderland and said in the course of the opinion that the
courts should pause long enough to consider fully the constitutionality of the act before it should assume to become the adviser of
three millions of people in the State of Michigan.
A large number of authorities are cited in support of the contention that the court will not decide a moot question. Those authorities, it seems to me, are not applicable to the question before
the court. If there were no controversy between the parties appealing to the court, any decision of the court would be a decision of a
moot question. It is further argued strenuously by the court in its
opinion that it was without the power of the Legislature to impose
upon the court the duty to decide questions that did not arise in a
controversy between contending litigants, and further takes the position that unless the court in rendering the judgment is authorized
also to give consequential relief that the question is not one that the
court has jurisdiction to decide. In the minority opinion it is very
properly said:
"Herein lies the distinction between the declaratory judgment and moot cases or advisory opinions. A declaratory judgment is a final one forever binding on the parties on the issues
presented. The decision of a moot case is mere dictum, as no
rights are affected thereby; while an advisory opinion is but an
expression of the law as applied to certain facts not necessarily
in dispute and can have no binding effect on any future litigation between the interested parties."
In criticism of the majority opinion it is said that the* court
does not recognize the distinction between a declaratory judgment
which binds the parties and a mere advisory opinion or a decision of
a moot case.
The majority of the court quoted liberally from the opinion in
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346, and says:
"This case should forever put at rest this question.
absolutely decisive of the question before us."

It is

In the Muskrat case'it appears that Muskrat and others, on behalf of themselves and other -Cherokee citizens, were authorized to
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institute proceedings in the Court of Claims with a right of appeal
to the Supreme Court.
. . . to determine the validity of any Acts of Congress passed since said Act of July 1, 1902, in so far as said Acts,
or any of them, attempted to increase or extend the restrictions
upon alienation, incumbrance or the right to lease allotments of
land of Cherokee citizens or to increase the -number of persons
entitled'to share in the final distribution of lands and funds of
the Cherokees beyond those enrolled for allotment as of Septeinber 1, 1902, and provided for in said Act of July 1, 1902."
The proceedings under that Act were instituted and brought to
the Supreme Court, the court holding that the Act of March 1, 1907,
above quoted, by which the Supreme Court was authorized to determine the validity of various acts having reference to the Indian
tribes was in excess of legislative authority and that Congress had
no power to confer power other than judicial power upon the court,
or to require of it other than judicial action; that the proceedings
there under consideration did not require the exercise of judicial
power and ordered the dismissal of the proceedings. The Supreme
Court said in that opinion:
"Judicial power is the power of the court to pronounce a
judgment and carry it into effect between persons and parties
who bring a case before it for decision. (Miller Const. 314.)
The 'exercise of judicial power is limited to cases and controversies. Beyond this it does not extend, and unless it is asserted
in a case or controversy within the meaning of the Constitution
the power to exercise it is nowhere conferred."
It Will be noted that in that case the parties whose interests
would be affected by the decision of the Supreme Court were in large
numbers not before the court and the statute imposing upon the
court the duty to determine the rights of the parties was in effect
the duty merely to pass upon the constitutionality of a congressional
enactment without the parties being before the court. This the court
held was beyond the power of Congress. As to the Muskrat case,
ex-Justice Charles E. Hughes, now Secretary of State, in a supplemental statement to the recent report of the committee having the
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matter of declaratory judgments in charge, says (Central Law Journal, Vol. 91, p. 435) :
"It is true that the Muskrat case dealt with the validity of
an Act of Congress, but the ground of the decision was the
fundamental one that the judicial power extended to 'cases and
controversies,' that is, that the judicial power was 'the right to
determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants,
duly instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction.' (219 U. S., p.
361.) It was not because the question was the determination of
the validity of an Act of Congress, but because this question
did not arise in an actual controversy, that the court found itself without power to determine it. Had there been an actual
controversy, the question of the validity of an Act of Congress,
or any other question properly brought before the court, could
have been determined. But in the absence of an actual controversy, neither that question nor any other could properly be
determined by the court. It was pointed out that the power to
decide upon the constitutional validity of a statute existed only
when the court was called upon to determine an actual controversy. It was said that the whole purpose of the law there in
question was to determine the validity of the class of legislation,
not in a suit arising between parties concerning a property right
necessarily involved in the decision, but in a proceeding against
the government in its sovereign capacity. The United States
was to be made a defendant, but it had no interest adverse to
the claimant's, the suit being brought solely to determine the
validity of the legislation in question.
"I do not think, therefore, that it distinguishes the Muskrat
case to say that it related to the determination of constitutional
questions, for this fails to state the ground upon which the
court found itself unable to determine the constitutional question. I think that the paragraphs relating to the Muskrat case
should be changed, and particularly that portion which states
the distinction between the Muskrat ease and the proposed legislation. I do not think it should be said that probably legislation, conferring a power to determine the validity of an Act
of Congress, would be within the rule in the Muskrat case. The
question will be whether there is a 'case' or 'actual controversy,'
and if there is not, it may be assumed that the statute would be
held to be invalid whether or not it extended to the determination of constitutional questions. The point of distinction, it
seems to me, should be, and it is sufficient to state, simply that
the proposed legislation is intended to deal only with actual
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controversies and proposes that where there is an actual controversy between litigants the court may render a declaratory
judgment."
I think it a fair conclusion that where there is an actual controversy and the parties are before the court, the courts may determine such controversy under legislative enactment so authorizing, although consequential relief is not asked.
By comparing the sections of the Michigan Act with those of
the Kansas Act, it will be observed that in the Michigan Act it is not
expressly stipulated that the declaratory judgment is limited to
actual controversies, while Section 1 of the Kansas Act, passed subsequent to the Michigan Act and after the decision in the Anway
case, begins "In cases of actual controversy."
Such judgments are now rendered by the courts without express
statutory authority and without necessarily being enforced by process of the court, such as a judgment to quiet title, a judgment declaring marriages void or valid, a judgment construing wills or other
written instruments, confirming the validity of municipal bond issues,
a judgment directing an executor or trustee in administering his
trust, a judgment on appeal by the appellate court in a criminal
case reviewing the decisions of the trial court in admitting and rejecting evidence and in giving and refusing instructions in a case
where there is a mistrial. (Commonwealth v. Matthews, 89 Ky. 287.)
And in a case where there has been an acquittal the court can and
will declare the law. (Criminal Code, Sees. 335, 336 and 337.)
A case worthy of note is Barth, Mayor v. McCann, Police Judge,
29 Ky. L. R. 707. In 1906 the question of closing the saloons
on Sunday was acute in Louisville. Warrants had been taken out
against various saloonkeepers charging violation of Section 1303 of
the Kentucky Statutes, providing:
"Any person who shall on Sunday keep open a barroom or
other place for the sale of spirituous, vinous or malt liquors,.
or who shall sell or otherwise dispose of such liquors or any of
them, shall be ftned not less than ten nor more than fifty dollars
for each offense."
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McCann, police judge, sustained demurrers to the warrants on
the ground that the statute was unconstitutional, amongst other
grounds. The mayor, under the provision of the statute that it
should be his duty to see that the ordinances and laws of the city
were enforced, filed in the Court of Appeals his petition for a mandamus in the name of the Commonwealth in his official capacity as
relator, seeking to have a writ issued against the police, judge, compelling him to hear and try the writs. The defendant demurred to
the petition, claiming that the plaintiff had no legal capacity to
maintain the action and the court had no jurisdiction of the subject matter and the petition did not state a cause of action. The
Court of Appeals held that it was McCann's duty as police judge to
enforce the law, but denied the motion for a mandamus by an equally
divided court, three of the judges being of the opinion that the court
has the power under the Constitution to award the writ and three
of them that it has not such power, and therefore the writ was denied;
Judge Cantrill, then a member of the court, being ill and unable to
act. Under this state of case the court, not being willing to issue the
writ and, it seems, from sheer necessity, made a declaration as to
the law and said:
"In view of the importance of the questions involved, we
have expressed our views as above indicated, assuming when
the judge of the city court is advised by this court that the
statute is constitutional, it will be his pleasure to enforce the
law and discharge his duty faithfully in upholding the mayor
and police of the city in the efforts to do so."
The effect of the advisory opinion was that the constitutionality
of Section 1303 of the statute and the right of the Commonwealth
and of the city to have the statute and ordinances against the sale
of liquor on Sunday enforced and the right to keep open saloons or
sell liquor on Sunday were no longer undetermined questions.
Siler v. White Star Coal Co., 190 Ky. 7. A careful reading of
the opinion would indicate that the court construed and declared the
meaning of a contract where there was an actual controversy between the parties as to its meaning. Without such construction the
parties in that case could not have known what their rights were and
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while it does not appear in the opinion, it does appear in the record,
that the court obtained jurisdiction of the case because there was
some small amount of royalty due and the rights that tlie respective
parties had in that royalty were determined in the judgment appealed from. It would be well that the construction of such contract should be permitted by statutory enactment and not be dependent upon whether there was. or was not royalty then to be
divided.
A frequent confusion of decisions upon law questions is found.
It is most difficult for counsel to advise his client as to what the
courts will hold upon the state of case submitted to him by his client.
He examines the authorities and may thnik that he finds decisions
that will warrant him in advising his client and yet he knows that
in taking his advice and acting upon it, the client takes a chance as
to what the ultimate result may be. Mr. Bigelow, in his work on
Torts, 8th Edition, page 4, says:
"What is meant by 'legal rightV' The specific answer is
whatever the judge, or judge and jury, in a particular case
may decide. As a matter of fact, most cases in the higher "courts
are cases in which the judges must decide the questions of right.
Such, indeed, is the complexity of human affairs that even
'natural' rights so called and rights already strictly defined may
be drawn in issue so as to raise a question which must wait upon
the decision of the judge in regard to the jaw."
How often a man will forego a claim of what he considers a
legal right, rather than chance the decision of the court upon it after
long and expensive litigation. A declaratory judgment would state
the right in advance.
The declaratory judgment takes away no right of procedure
now authorized. It rests within the sound discretion of the court
to award it or not to award it. Of course, this discretion is a
judicial, and not an arbitrary discretion.
The Michigan and the Kansas Statutes both state, it seems to
me, the true ground for the declaratory judgment, that the statute
shall 'be "liberally construed and liberally administered with a view
of making the courts more serviceable to the people." Its discussion
and consideration can well be made to turn upon this principle. It
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should not be considered in the light of whether or not it will increase or decrease litigation. It is not evident that it will do either.
The courts are created to administer justice in order to preserve the
well-being of society. They are but instrumentalities created by the
State for this purpose. The bar are officers of the court to aid the
court in this high purpose, and I can well see that to declare the
rights of parties before either has breached a right of the other
would call for less work from the courts than to settle the disputes
after the breach has occurred and losses on the one side orthe other
have been sustained.
A very excellent criticism of the majority opinion in the Anway
case by Prof. Borchard, of Yale Law School, will ,be found in 30
Yale Law Journal, December, 1920, No. 2, page 161. It is there
well said:
When it is recalled that England has for two
centuries been familiar with the doctrine of separation of powers
and that the existing provision for declaratory judgments was
adopted by the courts themselves under their rule-making au,
thority and not imposed on them by Act of Parliament, the
validity of the Michigan court's argument is weakened. No
English court, nor probably any other but this court, could
possibly conceive that a decalaratory judgment was not- the
exercise of, judicial power."
A similar criticism may be found in Columbia Law Journal,
Vol. 21, No. 2, page 168, February, 1921, in which it seems to be
demonstrated that the majority opinion in the Anway case is un
sound; and in the same volume, page 115, there is a discussion approving the power and the policy of legislative action authorizing
declaratory judgments and supporting the conclusion by numerous
authorities. In no discussion that I have had access to, is the majority opinion in the Anway case approved.
For the benefit of those who would prosecute the investigation
further I append a memorandum of publications where the question
is discussed, and in every instafice with .approval
I have been impressed anew, while preparing this paper, with
the real service that is being rendered the courts, the profession and
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the public by the law journals. Every lawyer should have at least
one first-class law magazine coming regularly to his desk.
The value of the declaratory judgment is evidenced by the fact
that it is constantly used and for many years has -been used, not
only in the courts of England, but also in Scotland, Ireland, India,
Ontario, British Columbia and other Canadian provinces, in Australia, New Zealand and several of the Australian States, and in Germany and Austria.
The American Bar Association approved this mode of procedure and has been, for several terms, through its committee, pressing upon Congress the need of legislation to establish it in the
Federal courts.
The American Judicature Society has given its approval to the
declaratory judgment.
The Commissioners on Reform of State Laws have given their
unqualfied approval and have prepared a tentative Act to be reviewed and later submitted to the legislatures of the various States.
The Tennessee State Bar Association, at its 1920 meeting, gave its
unanimous approval.
A bill authorizing the declaratory judgment will probably be
presented at the next meeting of the Kentucky Legislature. If this
Association is prepared to say that the declaratory judgment is a
constitutional method of procedure and will "make the courts more
serviceable to the people," such expression will go far toward inducing the Legislature to give its sanction.
I am glad to submit the question to the Association for such
disposition as it thinks wise and right.
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APPENDIX.

FIRST TENTATIVE DRAFT
OF

AN

ACT RELATING TO DECLARATORY JUDGMIENTS AND DECREES AND TO
MAKE UNIFORM THE LAw wrii REFERENCE THERETO.

Section 1. SCOPE. The courts of this State having jurisdiction in equity shall have power in any suit in equity or in any independent or interlocutory proceedings, to declare rights and other
legal relations on written requests for such declaration, whether or
not further relief is or could be claimed; and such declaration shall
have the force of a final judgment or decree.
Section 2. CONSTRUCTION. Any person interested under a
deed, will, contract, or other written instrument, or whose rights are
affected by a statute, municipal ordinance or franchise, may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under the
instrument, statute, ordinance or franchise, and a declaration of
rights or duties thereunder.

Section 3. BEFORE BREACH.

A contract may be construed be-

fore there has been a breach thereof.
Section 4. EXECUTORS, ETC. Any person interested as or
through an executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or other
fiduciary, creditor, devisee, legatee, heir, next of kin, or cestui que
trust, in the administration of a trust or of the estate of a decedent,
an infant, lunatic, or insolvent, may have a declaration of rights or
duties in respect thereto.
(a) To ascertain any class of creditors, devisees, legatees,
heirs, next of kin or others; or
(b) To direct the executors, administrators, or trustees, to do
or abstain from doing any particular act in their fiduciary capacity;
or
(c) To determine any"question arising in the administration
of the estate or trust, including questions of construction of wills
and other writings or instruments.
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Section 5. PARTIES. When declaratory relief is sought, all
persons shall be made parties who have or claim any interest which
would be affected by the declaration, and no declaration shall prejudice the rights of persons not parties to the proceeding. In any'proceeding which involves the validity of a statute the Attorney General of the State shall, before judgment is entered, be notified by the
party attacking the statute, and shall be entitled to be heard upon
such question. In any proceeding which involves the validity of a
municipal ordinance or franchise, the law officer of the municipality
shall be notified by the party attacking the ordinance or franchise,
and shall be entitled to be heard upon such question. And if the
ordinance or franchise is alleged to be unconstitutional, the Attorney
General of the State shall also be notified and be entitled to be
heard.
Section 6. DismcTIoNARY. The court may refuse to exercise
the power to declare rights or other legal relations in any proceeding where a decision under it would not terminate the uncertainty or
controversy which gave rise to the proceeding, or in any proceeding
where the declaration or construction is not necessary, and proper,
at the time under all the circumstances.
Section 7. RELIE, AFFmmATIVE OR NEGATIVE. When declaratory relief is sought the declaration may be either affirmative or
negative in form and effect.
Section 8. PRoCEDURE. Declaratory relief may be obtained by
means of the ordinary process and proceedings in equity, or by means
of a request or petition in equity, as the nature of the case may require, and where a declaration of rights or other legal relations is
the only relief asked, the case may be noticed for early hearing as
in the case of a motion.
Section 9. EXECUTORY REuEF. Where further relief based
upon a declaration of rights' or other legal relations shall become
necessary, or proper after such declaration has 'been made, application may be made on request or by petition to the court having jurisdiction to grant such relief for an 6rder directed to any party or
parties whose rights, or other legal relations have been determined
by such declaration, to show cause why such further relief should
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not be granted forthwith upon such reasonable notice as shall be
prescribed by the court in its order.
Section 10. TRIAL BY JURY. In any suit or proceeding under
this Act in which an issue of fact is involved, and a trial by jury of
such issue is required by the Constitution or the laws of this State,
such issue may be submitted to a jury in the form of interrogatories,
wiith such instructions by the court as may be proper, whether a general verdict be rendered or required or not, and such interrogatories
and answers shall constitute a part of the record of the case.
Section 11. CosTs. Unless the parties shall agree by stipulation, as to the allowance thereof, costs in proceedings authorized by
this Act, shall 'be allowed in accordance with the rules of practice,
followed in proceedings in equity, wherever applicable and when
not applicable costs or such part thereof as to the court may seem
just, in view of the particular circumstances of the case, may be'
awarded to either party, or apportioned between them.

Section 12.

ACT REMEDIAL, ETC.

The enumeration of specific

powers of the courts under this Act shall not be held or construed
to limit or restrict in any manner the general powers conferred upon
the courts by the first section of this Act. This Act is declared to be
remedial, and is to be liberally construed and liberally administered
with the view of making the courts more serviceable to the people.

Section 13.

WORDS CONSmUED.

The word person wherever

used in this Act shall be construed and held to include and mean
any person, partnership, joint stock company, incorporated association, or society, or municipal or other corporation of any character
whatsoever..

Section 14.
and after the.

COMMMNCEMENT.

day of__.,

This act shall be in force from
19_.
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